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Summary
It is commonly assumed that psychiatric violence is motivated by delusions, but here the concept of a re-
versed impetus is explored, to understand whether delusions are formed as ad-hoc or post-hoc rationali-
zations of behaviour or in advance of the actus reus.
The reflexive violence model proposes that perceptual stimuli has motivational power and this may trigger 
unwanted actions and hallucinations. The model is based on the theory of ecological perception, where 
opportunities enabled by an object are cues to act. As an apple triggers a desire to eat, a gun triggers a 
desire to shoot. These affordances (as they are called) are part of the perceptual apparatus, they allow 
the direct recognition of objects – and in emergencies they enable the fastest possible reactions.
Even under normal circumstances, the presence of a weapon will trigger inhibited violent impulses. The 
presence of a victim will also, but under normal circumstances, these affordances don’t become violent 
because negative action impulses are totally inhibited, whereas in psychotic illness, negative action im-
pulses are treated as emergencies and bypass frontal inhibitory circuits. What would have been object 
recognition becomes a blind automatic action.
A range of mental illnesses can cause inhibition to be bypassed. At its most innocuous, this causes both 
simple hallucinations (where the motivational power of an object is misattributed). But ecological percep-
tion may have the power to trigger serious violence also –a kind that’s devoid of motives or planning and 
is often shrouded in amnesia or post-rational delusions.
utilization behavior / automatic action / ecological perception / violence / delusions
As part of an observational experiment, two 
patients were invited (separately) into the apart-
ment of their doctor (the investigator). The pa-
tients were to be exposed to a few tableaus (a 
made bed, a sideboard laid out with food etc.) 
and their behavior, which was already known to 
be bizarre – was recorded. One of the patients, a 
52-year-old house-wife, was presented with was 
a syringe and vial of saline. Without hesitation, 
she drew the saline and attempted to give the 
doctor an injection.
The other patient, a 51-year-old male engi-
neer, was presented with a painting sitting on 
the ground. A hammer and nail were nearby. 
The patient used the tools to hang the painting. 
The patient was led into a bedroom. He stripped 
and hopped into bed. A gun lay out on a table-
top. When the patient spotted it, he headed to it 
with an expression of sheer delight. The patient 
picked it up and spun the barrel. There were 
no cartridges, so he searched the room until he 
found some, then he loaded the gun… and the 
experiment had to be called off. The doctor had 
to intervene to confiscate the weapon. The pat-
ent was not angry, he had no prior homicidal 
intentions but would have had no choice but to 
shoot the doctor just as the woman has no choice 
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but to inject him with saline. It was as if the gun 
was ‘telling’ the man to shoot [1]. Neither patient 
suffered delusions because they lacked the self-
reflexive criticality required to consider their ac-
tions. What they did experience, however, were 
simple ‘non-bizarre’ hallucinations. Somehow, 
these inanimate objects embodied enough au-
thority to motivate action: instructions to act 
emerged spontaneously as both thoughts and 
actions when the patients were exposed to the 
excitatory presence of objects.
This anecdote illustrates a significant problem 
with the current definitions and models of vio-
lence. Violence is defined as ‘human aggression 
is any behavior with the… intent to cause harm. 
In addition, the perpetrator must believe that the 
behavior will harm the target, and that the tar-
get is motivated to avoid the behavior... Violence 
is aggression that has extreme harm as its goal 
(e.g., death).’ [2] Clearly, in the cases observed 
above, the imminent homicide was neither ag-
gressive, nor violent. Indeed violent psychiatric 
acts aren’t compos mentis (in right mind) [3, 4] 
and have no mens rea (intent) although the ac-
tus reus (criminal action) may be fluent and even 
performed in good humor. Not only is there no 
mens rea, but some psychiatric acts are innocent 
of intent, negligence or recklessness. They there-
fore don’t fit current models of violence such as 
Anderson and Bushman’s 2002 generalized ag-
gression model (GAM - figure 1). This review 
does not focus on intentional violence, but op-
portunistic violence that is not driven by inten-
tion – whether rational or delusional.
Just as the GAM model is premised on intent, 
debate about psychiatric violence is also. Essen-
tially the difference is cosmetic – there is still a 
general belief that psychiatric violence is inten-
tional, the primary difference being that the in-
tent is delusional or based on hallucinatory ex-
perience. A central motif of this kind of violence 
is the deific decree, which is a hallucination in-
volving God’s commands. Debate focuses on 
deific decrees partly because the delusion cit-
ed in the standard test case for criminal insanity 
in common-law countries was a delusion of this 
type (ie. M’Naughton, 1843) [5]. Other reasons 
for this focus include the relative comprehensi-
bility of this type of delusion to people who do 
not suffer delusions. Finally also common – with 
grandiose delusions occurring in about 55 of a 
sample of 1103 schizophrenic case notes [6]. But 
despite the prevalence of delusions and halluci-
nations in mental illness, delusions do not nec-
essarily motivate the actus reus (criminal action). 
If it were, delusions of deific decrees should be 
considered similarly to any fundamentalist re-
ligious belief [5], meaning the 9/11 attacks and 
countless other acts of religious terrorism would 
be defensible by arguing that the perpetrators 
were non-copus mentis.
To date, there is no cogent and well-accepted 
hypothesis for the relationship between delu-
sional mens rea and associated actus reus. Al-
though delusory intentions hypotheses are rel-
atively well accepted [eg. 7, 8], they are poor-
ly developed and rely on the Descartian logic 
that intent must precede action. But recent neu-
roscience doesn’t support this hypothesis (see 
below), and furthermore, there is evidence that 
delusional patients don’t act on their delusion-
al beliefs [9]. The hypotheses for delusions that 
remain tenable are models that emphasize post-
hoc explanations and post-experiential meta-log-
ic [10]. These models suggest that delusions oc-
cur to explain actions and events that are oth-
erwise inexplicable [11]. This is a parallel of 
Bem’s self-perception theory: ‘Individuals come 
to “know” their own attitudes, emotions, and 
other internal states partially by inferring them 
from observations of their own overt behavior 
and/or the circumstances in which this behav-
ior occurs.’ [12].
Delusional intentions are roughly classed thus: 
paranoiac-defensive narratives, where violence 
occurs in the belief that it is in self-defense. Gran-
diose and manic-delusional narratives are where 
violence is motivated by a swollen sense of self-
empowerment or sense of entitlement; and al-
truistic narratives, where violence is regrettable, 
but believed to be essential for the greater good 
[8, 13, 14]. In these paradigms the delusionary 
motivations for violence are considered to be 
a product of psychiatric illness, but the mech-
anism that turns perception into actus reus are 
still unquestioned. In this paper, the case for vi-
olence as a direct product of perception is intro-
duced by distinguishing post-rationalized delu-
sions from delusional intentions. Post-rational-
ized delusions follow reflexive actions that are 
an intrinsic part of the perceptual process.
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In any violence, the mens rea is normatively 
conceptualized as the point at which an action 
commences; the actus reus, a deliberate conse-
quence with instruments and materials as ‘tools’ 
for action. The reflexive action model reverses 
this model by presenting the ‘tool’ as potential-
ly being the trigger of an action that triggers and 
therefore precedes delusional ideation. Here, the 
technology is not just a means, but part of the 
very hallucinatory experience that drives delu-
sional narratives.
The bACkgRound: AuTomATiC PeRCePTion
There is a long history of debate about how 
people (and animals) perceive, and models 
abound. I refer readers to some of the literature, 
but will not enter the debate in this paper. For 
reviews on the many models and their strengths 
and weaknesses, see [15-17] and perhaps a text 
book also. Instead, this article hypothesizes 
about the implications of the ecological theory 
of perception (one of the prominent theories of 
perception), when applied to the question of in-
trapersonal or self-inflicted violence. The eco-
logical theory of perception is not always use-
ful for understanding perceptual phenomena – 
in particular it has a weakness when it comes to 
perceiving unrecognizable phenomena [18]. De-
spite this weakness, the theory has demonstrat-
ed strengths for understanding how recogniza-
ble objects and opportunities are identified [18 
(Peer commentary) [19-21].
The concept of ecological perception is that ob-
jects and opportunities are recognized by the ac-
tions they enable. An object is recognized by the 
thoughts that commence as part of the process 
of perception; once it is familiar, a syringe is not 
recognized by its color or shape – it is recog-
nized by impulses that revolve around the po-
tential opportunities it enables. Equally an apple 
says eat me [19], and as demonstrated above a 
gun says shoot me. In humans and animals with 
well-developed frontal cortices, these impulses 
are not always acted on because of an inhibito-
ry reflex prevents action from being automatic. 
This reflex is primed by the social context and 
the milieu [22]. A useful term for contextual in-
hibition is found in foundational environmen-
tal psychology literature: it is the behavior set-
ting – a concept first articulated by Barker and 
Wright [23].
In the ecological theory of perception, percep-
tion is not understood as a cognitive process, but 
as a management system for desire and action 
- it is thus visceral not intellectual. It is a stab of 
hunger or a proto-desire for a taste that causes 
the recognition of food – not a cognitive analysis 
of available sense data. This means impulses will 
progress into action unless inhibition is main-
tained. In healthy people and more evolved an-
imals, decisions are made at the moment of rec-
ognition whether to engage and accept the im-
pulse as a declarative desire, or to ignore it and 
choose another course of action altogether. Im-
pulses are limited by context (the behavior set-
ting, and further by choice). But in a number of 
conditions including hypofrontality, inhibition is 
weak, choices are not made and actions are thus 
automatic [24, 25]. Simple creatures that have no 
frontal cortex have no choice but to act accord-
ing to their perceptions [20].
Behavior is inextricably related to opportuni-
ties, even from an evolutionary perspective [21]. 
Objects that contain such opportunities and thus 
demand action are called affordances [19, 20].
Neither behavior settings, nor affordances ap-
pear in isolation. Just as perception is continu-
ous, so too are affordances [16]. All animals en-
gage in affordances because they are always on 
the lookout to recognize them. One is connected 
to another in series, and likewise behavior set-
tings are connected similarly. Affordances build 
on one another. In the study above, the doctor 
was a natural complimentary affordance to both 
the syringe and the gun –His status changed 
from doctor to patient or target only once the 
syringe or gun had been automatically engaged 
with.
Reflexive violence is hypothesized to occur 
when the constant stream of action and thought 
(that we humans are continually engaged in) 
is completely co-opted by a series of automat-
ic negative affordances. This will occur either 
in a behavior setting that allows such action, or 
when automatic inhibition is weakened - either 
by biological deficits or the disinhibitory effects 
of drugs or alcohol (it is well established that 
disinhibition is a common symptom of psychotic 
or biological conditions or substance abuse).
Deficits of perceptual inhibition
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The patients with the gun and the syringe were 
showing symptoms of a spectrum of utilization 
behavior disorders, all of which erode person-
al autonomy. These are utilization behavior, im-
itation behavior and environmental dependency 
syndromes. In one study, these were found to be 
ubiquitous in cases of frontal lesions; 100% of the 
29 patients with frontal lesions that were studied 
developed these behaviors to some degree [26]. 
52% (n=15) of these patients developed utiliza-
tion behavior, where engagement in affordanc-
es cannot be prevented, even against authorita-
tive contrary instructions [27]. Other behaviors 
included environmental dependency syndrome 
which is where a patient depends on behavioral 
cues from the milieu [1]; and imitation behavior, 
where patients automatically imitate the behav-
ior of others, (for example, if they are watching 
someone else putting on a pair of glasses, they 
will try to do so themselves, even if they are al-
ready wearing glasses [27]). Only one patient at 
the time of the study showed none of these syn-
dromes, but he developed them three weeks af-
ter the study was complete. These syndromes, 
all bizarrely lacking in autonomy, are presumed 
to be caused by the excitatory presence of an af-
fordance (perceived opportunity) when the in-
hibitory neurons of the frontal cortex have been 
severed [1, 24]. This makes the perception-action 
pathway automatic, and in extreme cases, func-
tionally identical to the perceptions of primitive 
creatures, except for a much larger and expand-
able ontology, and therefore more programmed 
reflexive actions.
The utilization behavior spectrum disorders 
seem to occur wherever frontal connectivity is 
lost. The report of Lhermitte, Pillon [26] also 
identifies other conditions that sometimes cause 
utilization behavior – these include various oth-
er focal lesions, Parkinson’s disease, progressive 
supraneuclear palsy, Altzheimer’s disease, and 
multiple vascular accidents.
Utilization behavior-like patterns are also com-
mon in non-biological psychotic conditions. 
These are more complex than biological lesions, 
and are thus not strictly speaking the same. In 
manic and psychotic disorders at least, the inhi-
bition of perceptual stimuli appears to depend 
on the emotive nature of the stimuli, with per-
cepts that have a positive affective bias being 
over-inhibited and affectively negative ones be-
ing extremely under-inhibited. This was found 
in a sample of 10 akinetic psychiatric patients, 
10 more common psychiatric patients1 and ten 
healthy controls. All participants were shown 
emotive images while undergoing fMRI scans 
of their frontal lobes. The emotional bias of the 
images was generic and indisputable, regard-
less of acculturation. Negative pictures includ-
ed things like a mangled face, positive ones a 
happy baby. A neutral condition was also added 
– it was a piece of grey card [28]. Among other 
findings, it was noticed that in the negative con-
dition healthy controls showed equal inhibito-
ry and excitatory activity, thus cancelling each 
other out. Psychiatric patients, on he other hand, 
showed very low levels of inhibitory activation 
relative to neural excitation for negative stimu-
li, thereby replicating utilization behavior spec-
tra conditions, albeit specifically in circumstanc-
es that are charged with negative emotions [25]. 
Thus patients with schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder may also present with automatic and 
uncontrollable behaviors, but only when the ob-
jects of perception are seen as negative [25].
It may be difficult to assess what constitutes 
negativity, but affective qualities are often rel-
atively universal, despite the undeniable fact 
that subjective opinions are based on culturally 
encoded schemata. And different schemas will 
evoke different responses - if the ‘object’ of atten-
tion is situational, negativity may mean harmful, 
threatening or wrong. In a social situation neg-
ativity may be linguistically encoded, and com-
municated through words and deeds. Social 
expressions of negativity may include expres-
sions of contempt, disgust, defensiveness, bellig-
erence, dominance, stonewalling, anger, whin-
ing, sadness, tension or fear [29]. It’s important 
to note that these affective cues are subtle and 
function on an automatic and precognitive level 
(if cognition strictly speaking plays a role at all), 
and thus may never be declarative. Social nega-
tive affect, for instance, is typically not declara-
tively noticed by participants, but can be identi-
fied by psychologists trained in the Specific Af-
fect Coding System (SPAFF) [30]. Furthermore, 
with automatic actions, the time lag between 
1  The akinetic and catatonic patients included 7 with type 1 
bipolar disorder, and 3 with a schizophrenia diagnosis. The 
patients with common psychiatric conditions included 7 with 
type-1 bipolar disorder, and 3 with paranoid schizophrenia.
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impulse and action is virtually non-existent, as 
such automatic actions cannot be considered to 
be premeditated [31]. This is supported by the 
close examination of the psychologist’s reports 
from a French courthouse, which recorded 210 
homicides committed between 1975 and 2005. 
Of these 14 were identified as being potentially 
psychiatric. All were committed by schizophren-
ic patients, and all shared distinctive features; 
none of the 14 homicides appear to have been 
premeditated, all were committed alone, and all 
used available means (eg. bare hands) [14].
In a grounded study of 30 women in extreme-
ly abusive relationships, all reported that attacks 
appeared to occur unpredictably, suggesting that 
much domestic violence may also be unpremed-
itated. The caveat here is that both the author 
of the study attributes a motivation to this un-
predictability; “Instilling the sense of fear that a 
physical attack is possible at any moment is one 
way battering men control their partners” [32]. 
Like the observations of Richard-Devantoy, Du-
flot [14], these attacks appear to be spontaneous 
and unpremeditated, because assailants ‘most-
ly’ used available means – victims were ‘hit with 
objects such as telephones, lamps, chairs’ [32]. 
To link these assailants to the psychiatric ones 
further, victims reported noticing symptoms 
that are characteristic of severe psychiatric con-
ditions, such as “psycho eyes” and degraded 
speech patterns [32]. Abnormal eye gaze and is 
not useful for diagnosis of psychotic disorders, 
but they are sufficiently common that they have 
been the subject of many studies and are thus 
recognized as associated symptoms of schizo-
phrenia. Degraded speech on the other hand, is 
a characteristic symptom of active phase schiz-
ophrenia [33].
Automatic triggers and delusional rationali-
zations:
If an affordance is charged with a negative af-
fect, the threshold of reactivity (when proto-de-
sires turn to unwanted actions) is increased rad-
ically in psychiatric conditions wherever inhibi-
tion is reduced. This doesn’t need to be a symp-
tom of a primary psychiatric disorder, however 
– it can equally be caused by substance abuse 
[34], and in reality substance abuse is single the 
most common factor of any violence outside of 
war [32, 35].
It appears that automatic actions somehow by-
pass whatever it is that tags a sense of self-agen-
cy (Schütz-Bosbach, Avenanti [36] suggests this 
may be cortical inhibition). This may be experi-
enced three ways; as a hallucination, where the 
action-demanded by an affordance is misattrib-
uted [25]; as an episodic amnesia, where events 
cannot be remembered because they were nev-
er properly experienced; or as delusions because 
actions are concurrently or retrospectively ra-
tionalized [11, 37]; much the same way as indi-
viduals come to develop a self-identity based on 
their own actions, functionally as if they were 
outside observers [12]. Indeed, detailed first-
hand accounts of paranoid schizophrenia some-
times provide insight into the retrospection in-
volved in fostering delusions:
“A little girl said to her mother, ‘Is that man 
possessed by the Devil Mummy?’ Her mother 
also looked at me and replied, ‘Yes dear.’ This 
coincidence just when I was thinking this very 
thought, was enough to prove (it to me)... I had 
to make sense, any sense, out of all these uncan-
ny coincidences. I did it by radically changing 
my conception of reality.” [38].
Cases of amnesia may be more common 
than cases of delusions. In one London-based 
study complete or partial episodic amnesia was 
claimed in 20 out of 50 homicides. While this 
data may have been confounded somewhat by 
criminals who wish to avoid a guilty sentence, 
the high number is also reflected in various con-
ditions that made such claims plausible; biolog-
ical injury, psychosis and intoxication [39]. In 
some of these cases, the assailant handed them-
selves in, knowing they were prone extreme ac-
tions without remembering them.
Unlike the lady with the syringe and the man 
with the gun, the negative charge provided by 
the negative affordances and violence may pro-
vide an impression of deliberate purpose, but 
only after or during the act because the moti-
vation to act was never intentional. It comes 
from recognition of the weapon or a victim that 
didn’t exist earlier, yet actions are very convinc-
ing proof of intention even to the assailant. But 
sometimes no plausible motive can be found – or 
even hallucinated; these then may be amnesic;
‘A young married man, following an enforced 
starvation of three days, murdered, for no rea-
son, one of his children with whom he had been 
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on the best of terms. He had no memory of his 
actions’[39].
In May 2011, in Tenerife (the Canary Islands), 
a homeless man (presumed to be schizophrenic) 
grabbed a knife from a supermarket shelf, and 
spontaneously decapitated a nearby tourist. He 
was apparently unprovoked and his violence 
was almost certainly not premeditated. The only 
time the assailant had ever met the tourist be-
fore was just a few moments earlier. The victim 
had complained to a security guard about being 
harassed, and the assailant had been moved on. 
The assailant immediately returned to the su-
permarket and killed the tourist [40] . Although 
it is far from clear why the tourist was victim-
ized, there’s no doubt that her presence caused 
the assailant to become rapidly aroused. In this 
case, the convergence of the negative affordance 
suggested by the by the tourist (‘target me’) and 
the no less horrific negative affordance suggest-
ed by the chef’s knife, which was for sale in the 
supermarket (‘kill with me’) came together in a 
particularly tragic way. The assailant’s delusions 
must have implicated the tourist in a very specif-
ic way, because the he took her severed head out 
to the street and declared; “I am God’s avenger 
and I come to mete out justice!” The delusional nar-
rative that this quotation speaks to has a mytho-
logical quality – and draws on common culture, 
but nevertheless must have developed with – or 
after, the events it related to –it couldn’t have 
developed earlier, because the assailant and the 
victim had never met.
Typically delusions are formed on layers of 
complimentary affordances, which have special 
(often encoded) meaning for the patient. These 
build quickly on themselves following a single 
line of logic that is either imperceptible or irrele-
vant to others [41]. These become delusional nar-
ratives, which leave little reasonable forensic ev-
idence, even though they make complete sense 
of the circumstances to the patient [38].
Random homicides by psychotic strangers are 
very rare [42], and for this reason, data is poor, 
but in a cross sectional study of homicides be-
tween 1978 and 1983, 1418 homicides were an-
alyzed and 108 were identified as having been 
committed by psychiatric patients. Of these only 
19 (17.6%) of the victims were strangers. Obvi-
ously sudden and impulsive violence doesn’t al-
ways involve strangers, but circumstances that 
do involve strangers are more likely to lack any 
reasonable motive. Of the stranger homicides, 16 
(14.8%) were utterly unprovoked [35]. Other ev-
idence suggesting that violent impulses are so-
matogenic come from other cases where no rea-
sonable motive can be found:
“…the couple were on the very best of terms. 
There had been occasional sexual intercourse 
and no major quarrels… On one occasion, for 
no apparent reason, he had seized her by the 
throat but had relaxed his grip without harming 
her. She had agreed to forget the incident and to 
continue their acquaintanceship. On the night of 
the murder they had spent the evening together 
listening to the radio at his home… As the girl 
rose to go he suddenly seized her by the throat 
and strangled her, placing the body under the 
bed and then notifying the police.” [43].
“He was in love with the girl and wished to 
marry her… Having met the girl one evening 
to discuss marriage arrangements, he sudden-
ly and without any warning felled her with a 
heavy piece of wood and stabbed her in the neck 
with his clasp knife.” [43].
The events of the Tenerife homicide appear to 
be qualitatively similar, as all these cases (and 
many more) suggest that psychiatric homicides 
can occur by circumstance rather than choice. 
In many cases, the attack is not remembered by 
the assailant [39, 43]. And if events are remem-
bered, what may appear to be a memory may 
in fact be a delusion or hallucinatory [44]. The 
Tenerife homicide may well be a case in point as 
the statement, “I am God’s avenger and I come 
to mete out justice!” implies. This statement ap-
pears to match the assailant’s actions (carrying 
the victim’s head by her hair, while clutching a 
knife in the other hand), but not the assailant’s 
intentions – because he clearly had none. Hallu-
cinations are like a fire, kindled out of perceived 
events, opportunities and objects. The availabili-
ty of a knife in the Tenerife case was not premed-
itated, and neither was picking it up. The oppor-
tunity to use the knife was also involuntary, even 
as a delusional narrative may have been grow-
ing during the quick series of tragic events.
The relationship between technology and ac-
tion is direct. Even the most simple of animals 
perceive external objects as affordances, auto-
matically triggering instinctive action. A barna-
cle drift in the ocean until it hits a hard surface 
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that it will then attach itself to [20]. A hard sur-
face is a very limited form of technology, but as 
life becomes more complex, so too does the tech-
nology it can engage. The sea-eagle’s uses stones 
to break egg-shells, and there are any number 
of animals that will make good use of a hol-
low tree. Obviously for humans technology is 
far more complex again, and human technolo-
gy enables a potential range of affordances that 
may be either specific (such as a custom part of 
an engine), or incredibly diverse like a computer. 
But the complexity of human technology does 
not make it dissimilar to a surface for a barna-
cle. Once the meaning of the object is known to 
the point that its use is automated, it triggers 
action in very much the same way – although 
the barnacle has no capacity to reprocesses in-
formation or to learn, and thereby cannot behave 
differently [20]. Choice is an evolutionarily ad-
vanced process, which given some conditions, 
isn’t even ubiquitous in human-kind, much less 
in simple life. Thus technology, once its func-
tion has been learned, is part of the process of 
thought and action.
It appears that the knife used in the Tenerife 
homicide was not just a weapon. It served an 
important role in the psychological process that 
led to the attack. In premeditated violence, the 
technology involved is a tool that is chosen af-
ter a decision to commit the act of violence is 
made. This presupposes a motive and a desire 
to cause harm, which was clearly the case in Ten-
erife, where the alleged assailant had not met 
the victim so much as ten minutes earlier. But 
technology, firearms in particular, do trigger vio-
lence that otherwise would never have occurred, 
whether or not there is a psychiatric condition. 
In the USA, about 40% of the deaths caused by 
firearms are accidental and involve children or 
teenagers [45]. This should come as no surprise; 
automatic reflexive inhibition in the frontal cor-
tex is low for children (8-10yrs) and lower still 
for adolescents (14-18yrs) [46]. A picture begins 
to emerge, where the perception of the oppor-
tunity that enables violence suggests violence. 
But more commonly, in cases of sudden psychi-
atric violence, the opportunity is not suggested 
by the weapon, but rather by the presence of a 
vulnerable victim. Violence of this sort is sud-
den, unplanned and direct – usually the attack is 
done with bear hands [3, 14, 35]. Although these 
circumstances are more common, in either case 
– the violence emerges spontaneously from the 
perception of an opportunity.
diSCuSSion
The issue of violence is a broad subject, and 
only part of the whole problem will be caused 
by reflexive action. This part is expected to be 
quite small overall, although it is likely to ex-
plain most psychosis related violence. One of the 
features of schizophrenia and type 1 bipolar dis-
order is that deliberation becomes very difficult, 
as is reflected in the endless Wisconsin card sort-
ing and Stroop tests that have been performed 
on schizophrenic patients [47]. The implication 
is that planning violent action will be difficult in 
this condition. Furthermore, the conditions that 
make reflexive action likely are present in these 
conditions [25]. Beyond this, becomes more dif-
ficult to further identify a group that suffers 
from reflexive violence, except to say that these 
symptoms are likely to be far more common in 
untreated psychosis, particularly first episode 
(about 80% of cases, in statistical meta-analysis), 
when insight is poor (about 40% of cases) and 
when associated with self-harm (approximate-
ly 90% of cases) [48].
Several etiological options are presented here 
that may give rise to reflexive violence. Of these, 
all are associated with reduced frontal inhibition, 
particularly when circumstances or communica-
tion are perceived as being affectively negatively 
charged. Analyses of specific forms of violence 
have been linked to cases of pedophilia, for in-
stance, and in these cases at least, frontal lesions 
are clearly evident in positron tomography stud-
ies. But it is premature to assert causality. Pedo-
philia is a form of violence that is universally re-
garded as negative, offering some support for 
the reflexive action hypothesis, but this support 
carries no external validity and low numbers of 
studies and subjects mean that even internal va-
lidity is notional. Having said this, it is interest-
ing to note that utilization behavior was found 
to be a common comorbidity along with all the 
paraphelias including pedophilia etc. [49].
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lence is not for unknown victims, but for the pa-
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es in on themselves.
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